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Abstract
A repeated network game where agents have quadratic utilities that depend on information external-
ities – an unknown underlying state – as well as payoff externalities – the actions of all other agents
in the network – is considered. Agents play Bayesian Nash Equilibrium strategies with respect to their
beliefs on the state of the world and the actions of all other nodes in the network. These beliefs are
refined over subsequent stages based on the observed actions of neighboring peers. This paper introduces
the Quadratic Network Game (QNG) filter that agents can run locally to update their beliefs, select
corresponding optimal actions, and eventually learn a sufficient statistic of the network’s state. The QNG
filter is demonstrated on a Cournot market competition game and a coordination game to implement
navigation of an autonomous team.
I. INTRODUCTION
Games with information and payoff externalities are common models of networked economic behavior.
In, e.g., trade decisions in a stock market, the payoff that a player receives depends not only on the
fundamental (unknown) price of the stock but on the buy decisions of other market participants. Thus,
players must respond to both, their belief on the price of the stock and their belief on the actions of other
players [2]. Similar games can also be used to model the coordination of members of an autonomous
team whereby agents want to select an action that is jointly optimal but only have partial knowledge
about what the action of other members of the team will be. Consequently, agents select actions that they
deem optimal given what they know about the task they want to accomplish and the actions they expect
other agents to take.
Work in this paper supported by ARO W911NF-10-1-0388, NSF CAREER CCF-0952867, NSF CCF-1017454, and AFOSR
MURI FA9550-10-1-0567. Part of the results in this paper have been submitted to ICASSP 2013 [1].
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2In both of the examples in the previous paragraph we have a network of autonomous agents intent on
selecting actions that maximize local utilities that depend on an unknown state of the world – information
externalities – and also the unknown actions of all other agents – payoff externalities. In a Bayesian setting
– or a rational setting, to use the nomenclature common in the economics literature [3] – nodes form a
belief on the actions of their peers and select an action that maximizes the expected payoff with respect
to those beliefs. In turn, forming these beliefs requires that each network element make a model of how
other members will respond to their local beliefs. The natural assumption is that they exhibit the same
behavior, namely that they are also maximizing their expected payoffs with respect to a model of other
nodes’ responses. But that means the first network element needs a model of other agents’ models which
shall include their models of his model of their model and so on. The fixed point of this iterative chain
of reasoning is a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE).
In this paper we consider repeated versions of this game in which agents observe the actions taken
by neighboring agents at a given time. In observing neighboring actions agents have the opportunity to
learn about the private information that neighbors are, perhaps unwillingly, revealing [2]. Acquiring this
information alters agents’ beliefs leading to the selection of new actions which become known at the
next play prompting further reevaluation of beliefs and corresponding actions. In this context we talk of
Bayesian learning because the agents’ goal can be reinterpreted as the eventual learning of peers’ actions
so that expected payoffs coincide with actual payoffs. This paper considers Gaussian prior distributions
and quadratic utilities. For this type of problem we introduce the Quadratic Network Game (QNG) filter
that agents can run locally to update their beliefs, select corresponding actions that maximize expected
payoffs, and eventually learn a sufficient statistic of the network’s state.
The burden of computing a BNE in repeated games is, in general, overwhelming even for small sized
networks [4]. This intractability has led to the study of simplified models in which agents are non-Bayesian
and update their beliefs according to some heuristic rule [5]–[9]. A different simplification is obtained
in models with pure information externalities where payoffs depend on the self action and an underlying
state but not on the actions of others. This is reminiscent of distributed estimation [10]–[19] since agents
deduce the state of the world by observing neighboring actions without strategic considerations on the
actions of peers. Computations are still intractable in the case of pure information externalities and for
the most part only asymptotic analyses of learning dynamics with rational agents are possible [20]–[22].
Explicit methods to maximize expected payoffs given all past observations of neighboring actions are
available only when signals are Gaussian [4] or when the network structure is a tree [23]. For the network
games considered here in which there are information as well as payoff externalities, not much is known
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The specific setting considered in this paper is introduced in Section II. Agents repeatedly play a game
whose payoffs are represented by a utility function that is quadratic in the actions of all agents and an
unknown real-valued parameter. At the start of the game each agent makes a private observation of the
unknown parameter corrupted by additive Gaussian noise. At each play stage agents observe actions of
adjacent peers from the previous stage that they incorporate into a local observation history which they
use to update their inference of the unknown parameter, and synchronously take actions that maximize
their expected payoffs. Actions that maximize expected payoffs with respect to local observations histories
are defined as best responses to the expected actions taken by other agents. When the expected actions
of other agents are also modeled as best responses with respect to their respective observation histories,
we say that the network settles into a BNE (Section II-A).
In Section III we determine a mechanism to calculate BNE actions from the perspective of an outside
clairvoyant observer that knows all private observations. For this clairvoyant observer the trajectory of the
game is completely determined but individual agents operate by forming a belief on the private signals of
other agents. We start from the assumption that this probability distribution is normal with an expectation
that, from the perspective of the outside observer, can be written as a linear combination of the actual
private signals. If such is the case, we prove that there exists a set of linear equations that can be solved
to obtain actions that are linear combinations of estimates of private signals (Lemma 1). This is then used
to show that after observing the actions of their respective adjacent peers the probability distributions on
private signals of all agents remain Gaussian with expectations that are still linear combinations of the
actual private signals (Lemma 2). We proceed to close a complete induction loop to derive a recursive
expression that the outside clairvoyant observer can use to compute BNE actions for all game stages
(Theorem 1).
In Section IV we leverage the recursion derived in Section III to derive the QNG filter that agents can
run locally, i.e., without access to all private signals, to compute their BNE action. Results in sections
III and IV are generalized to the case of vector states and observations (Section V). We apply the scalar
QNG filter to a Cournot competition model (Section VI) and to the coordinated movement of a team of
mobile agents (Section VII).
Notation. Vectors v ∈ Rn are written in boldface and matrices A ∈ Rn×m in uppercase. We use 0 to
denote all-zero matrices or vectors of proper dimension. If the dimension is not clear from context, we
specify 0n×m. We use 1 to denote all-one matrices or vectors of proper dimension and 1n×m to clarify
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4dimensions. We use ei to denote the ith element of the standard orthonormal basis of Rn and e¯i := 1−ei
to write an all-one vector with the ith component nulled.
II. GAUSSIAN QUADRATIC GAMES
We consider games with incomplete information in which N identical agents in a network repeatedly
choose actions and receive payoffs that depend on their own actions, an unknown scalar parameter θ ∈ R,
and actions of all other agents. The network is represented by an undirected connected graph G = (V,E)
with node set V = 1, . . . , N and edge set E. The network structure restricts the information available
to agent i who is assumed to observe actions of agents j in its neighborhood n(i) := {j : {j, i} ∈ E}
composed of agents that share an edge with him. The degree of node i is given by the cardinality of the
set n(i) and denoted as d(i) := #n(i). The neighbors of i are denoted ji,1 <, . . . , < ji,d(i). We assume
the network graph G is known to all agents.
At time t = 0 agent i observes a private signal xi ∈ R which we model as being given by the unknown
parameter θ contaminated with zero mean additive Gaussian noise i,
xi = θ + i. (1)
The noise variances are denoted as ci := E
[
21
]
and grouped in the vector c := [c1, . . . , cN ]T which
is assumed known to all agents. The noise terms i are further assumed independent across agents. For
future reference define the vector of private signals x := [x1, . . . , xN ]T ∈ RN×1 grouping all local
observations.
Consider a discrete time variable t = 0, 1, 2, . . . to index subsequent stages of the game. At each stage
t agent i takes scalar action ai(t) ∈ R. The selection of agent i, along with the concurrent selections
aj(t) of all other agents j ∈ V \ {i} results in a payoff ui(ai(t), {aj(t)}j∈V \i, θ) that agent i wants to
make as large as possible. In this paper we restrict attention to quadratic payoffs which for simplicity
we assume to be time invariant. Specifically, selection of actions {ai = ai(t)}i∈V when the state of the
world is θ results in agent i experiencing a reward
ui(ai, {aj}j∈V \i, θ) := −
1
2
a2i +
∑
j∈V \i
βijaiaj + δaiθ, (2)
where βij ∈ R for all i ∈ V , j ∈ V \ i and δ ∈ R are real valued constants. Notice that since
∂2ui/∂a
2
i = −1 < 0, the payoff function in (2) is strictly concave with respect to the self action ai of
agent i.
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not possible because neither the state θ nor the actions {aj(t)}j∈V \i are known to him. Rather, agent
i needs to reason about state θ and actions {aj(t)}j∈V \i based on its available information. At time
t = 0 only the private signal xi is known. Define then the initial information as hi,0 = {xi}. The
information hi,0 is used to reason about θ and the initial actions {aj(0)}j∈V \i that other agents are to
take in the initial stage of the game. At the playing of this stage, agent i observes the actions an(i)(0) :=
[aji,1(0), . . . , aji,d(i)(0)]
T ∈ Rd(i)×1 of all agents in his neighborhood. These observed neighboring actions
become part of the observation history hi,1 =
{
xi,an(i)(0)} =
{
h0,i,an(i)(0)
}
which allows agent i to
improve on his estimate of θ and the actions {aj(1)}j∈V \i that other agents will play on the first stage
of the game, thereby also affecting the selection of its own action ai(1). In general, at any point in time
t the history of observations hi,t is augmented to incorporate the actions of neighbors in the previous
stage,
hi,t :=
{
hi,t−1,an(i)(t− 1)
}
=
{
xi,an(i)(u), u < t
}
. (3)
The observed action history hi,t is then used to update the estimates of the world state θ and the upcoming
actions {aj(t)}j∈V \i of all other agents leading to the selection of the action ai(t) in the current stage
of the game.
The final components of the game that we introduce are the strategies σi,t that are used to map histories
to actions. In this paper we focus on pure strategies that can be written as functions that map history
realizations hi,t to actions ai(t)
σi,t : hi,t 7→ ai(t). (4)
We emphasize the difference between strategy and action. An action ai(t) is the play of agent i at time t,
whereas strategies σi,t refer to the map of histories to actions. We can think of the action ai(t) = σi,t(hi,t)
as the value of the strategy function σi,t associated with the given observed history hi,t. Further define the
strategy of agent i as the concatenation σi := {σi,u}u=0,...,∞ of strategies that agent i plays at all times.
Use σt := {σi,t}i∈V to refer to the strategies of all players at time t, σ0:t := {σu}u=0,...t to represent the
strategies played by all players between times 0 and t, and σ := {σu}u=0,...,∞ = {σi}i∈V to denote the
strategy profile for all agents i ∈ V and times t. As in the case of the network topology, the strategy σ
is also assumed to be known to all agents. We study mechanisms for the construction of strategies in the
following section.
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Given that agent i wants to maximize the utility in (2) but has access to the partial information available
in the observed history hi,t in (3), a reasonable strategy σi,t is to select the action ai(t) that maximizes
the expected utility with respect to the history hi,t. To write this formally note that this expected utility
depends on strategies σ0:t−1 played in the past by all agents and on strategies {σj,t}j∈V \i that all other
agents are to play in the upcoming turn. Fix then the past strategies σ0:t−1 and the upcoming strategies
{σj,t}j∈V \i of other players and define the corresponding best response of player i at time t as
BRi,t
(
σ0:t−1, {σj,t}j∈V \i
)
:= argmax
ai∈R
Eσ0:t−1
[
ui(ai, {σj,t(hj,t)}j∈V \i, θ)
∣∣hi,t]. (5)
The strategies σ0:t−1 in (5) played at previous times mapped respective histories {hj,u}j∈V to actions
{aj(u)}j∈V for u < t. Therefore, the past strategies σ0:t−1 determine the manner in which agent i updates
his beliefs on the state of the world θ and on the histories {hj,t}j∈V \i observed by other agents. As per (4)
the strategy profiles {σj(t)}j∈V \i of other players in the current stage permit transformation of history
beliefs {hj,t}j∈V \i into a probability distribution over respective upcoming actions {aj(t)}j∈V \i. The
resulting joint distribution on {aj(t)}j∈V \i and θ permits evaluation and maximization of the expectation
in (5).
One can think of the profiles {σj(t)}j∈V \i played by other agents in the upcoming stage as the model
agent i makes of the behavior of other agents. In that sense the sensible assumption is that other agents
are also playing best response to a best response model of other agents. I.e., agent i assumes agent j
is playing the best response to its respective model of the behavior of other agents and that the model
agent j makes of these responses is that these agents also play best response to a best response model.
This modeling assumption leads to the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) as the solution to
the fixed point equation
σ∗i,t(hi,t) = BRi,t(σ
∗
0:t−1, {σ∗j,t}j∈V \i), for all hi,t, (6)
where we have also added the restriction that an equilibrium strategy σ∗i,t−1 has been played for all
times u < t. We emphasize that (6) needs to be satisfied for all possible histories hi,t and not just for
the history realized in a particular game realization. This is necessary because agent i doesn’t know
the history observed by agent j but rather a probability distribution on histories. Thus, to evaluate the
expectation in (5) agent i needs a representation of the equilibrium strategy for all possible histories hj,t.
If all agents play their BNE strategies as defined in (6), σ∗i,t becomes optimal in the usual game
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7theoretic sense. There is no strategy that agent i could unilaterally deviate to that provides a higher
expected payoff than σ∗i,t [cf. (5)]. In that sense the BNE strategy is the best that agent i can do given
other agents’ strategies and his locally available information hi,t. In the rest of the paper we consider
agents playing with respect to the BNE strategy σ∗i,t at all times. To simplify future notation define the
expectation operator
Ei,t
[ · ] := Eσ∗0:t−1[ · | hi,t], (7)
to represent expectations with respect to the local history hi,t when agents have played the equilibrium
strategy σ∗0:t−1 in all earlier stages of the game. Similarly, we define the conditional probability distribution
of agent i at time t given past strategies σ∗0:t−1 and his information hi,t as Pi,t(·) := Pσ∗0:t−1
(· ∣∣hi,t).
Since ui(ai, {aj}j∈V \i, θ) is a strictly concave quadratic function of ai as per (2), the same is true of
the expected utility Ei,t
[
ui(ai, {σj,t}j∈V \i, θ)
]
that we maximize to obtain the best response in (5). We
can then rewrite (5) by nulling the derivative of the expected utility with respect to ai. It follows that
the fixed point equation in (6) can be rewritten as the set of equations
σ∗i,t(hi,t) =
∑
j∈V \{i}
βijEi,t[σ
∗
j,t(hj,t)] + δEi,t[θ], (8)
that need to be satisfied for all possible histories hi,t and agents i. Our goal is to develop a filter that
agents can use to compute their equilibrium actions a∗i (t) := σ
∗
i,t(hi,t) given their observed history hi,t.
We pursue this in the following section after some remarks.
Remark 1 It may be of interest to modify the utility in (2) to include more additive terms that are
functions of other actions {aj}j∈V \i and the state of the world θ but not of the self actions ai. This may
change the utility and the expected utility in (5) but doesn’t change the equilibrium strategy in (6). Since
these terms do not contain the self action ai, their derivatives are null and do not alter the fixed point
equation in (8).
Remark 2 The equilibrium notion in (6) is based on the premise of myopic agents that choose actions that
optimize payoffs at the present game stage. A more general model is to consider non-myopic agents that
consider discounted payoffs of future stages. Non-myopic behavior introduces another layer of strategic
reasoning. Forward looking agents would need to take into account the effect of their decisions at each
stage of the game on the future path of play knowing that other agents base their future decisions on what
they have previously observed. E.g., non-myopic agents might reduce their immediate payoff to harvest
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scope of this paper.
III. PROPAGATION OF PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
According to the model in (8), at each stage of the game agents use the observed history hi,t to estimate
the unknown parameter θ as well as the histories {hj,t}j∈V \i observed by other agents. They use the
latter and the known BNE strategy {σ∗j,t(hj,t)}j∈V \i to form a belief Pi,t({a∗j (t)}j∈V \i) on the actions
{a∗j (t)}j∈V \i of other agents which they use to compute their equilibrium action a∗j (t) at time t. Observe
that if the vector of private signals x := [x1, . . . , xN ]T is given – not to the agents but to an outside
observer – the trajectory of the game is completely determined as there are no random decisions. Thus,
agent i can form beliefs on the histories {hj,t}j∈V \i and actions {a∗j (t)}j∈V \i of other agents if it keeps
a local belief Pi,t(x) on the vector of private signals x. A method to track this probability distribution
is derived in this section using a complete induction argument.
Start by assuming that at given time t, the posterior distribution Pi,t(x) is normal. Recalling the
definition of the expectation operator Ei,t
[ · ] in (7), the mean of this normal distribution is Ei,t [x].
Define the corresponding error covariance matrix M ixx(t) ∈ RN×N as
M ixx(t) := Ei,t
[(
x−Ei,t [x]
)(
x−Ei,t [x]
)T ]
. (9)
Although agent i’s probability distribution for x is sufficient to describe its belief on the state of the
system, subsequent derivations are simpler if we keep an explicit belief on the state of the world θ.
Therefore, we also assume that agent i’s beliefs on θ and x are jointly Gaussian given history hi,t. The
mean of θ is Ei,t [θ] and the corresponding variance is
M iθθ(t) := Ei,t
[(
θ −Ei,t [θ]
)(
θ −Ei,t [θ]
)T ]
. (10)
The cross covariance M iθx(t) ∈ R1×N between the world state θ and the private signals x is
M iθx(t) := Ei,t
[(
θ −Ei,t [θ]
)(
x−Ei,t [x]
)T ]
. (11)
We further make the stronger assumption that the means of this joint Gaussian distribution can be written
as linear combinations of the private signals. In particular, we assume that for some known matrix
Li,t ∈ RN×N and vector ki,t ∈ RN×1 we can write
Ei,t [x] = Li,tx, Ei,t [θ] = k
T
i,tx. (12)
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combinations of the private signals x – indeed, x is not known by agent i in general. The assumption is
that from the perspective of an external observer the actual computations that agents do are equivalent
to the linear transformations in (12).
Under the complete induction hypothesis of Gaussian posterior beliefs at time t with expectations as
in (12), we show that agents play according to linear equilibrium strategies of the form
σ∗i,t(hi,t) = v
T
i,tEi,t[x], (13)
for some action coefficients vi,t ∈ RN×1 that vary across agents but are independent of the observed
history hi,t. These can be found by solving a system of linear equations. We do this in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider a Bayesian game with quadratic utility as in (2). Suppose that for all agents i, the
joint posterior beliefs Pi,t([θ,xT ]) on the state of the world θ and the private signals x given the local
history hi,t at time t are Gaussian with means expressed as the linear combinations of private signals in
(12) for some known vectors ki,t and matrices Li,t. Define the aggregate vector kt := [kT1,t, . . . ,k
T
N,t]
T ∈
RN2×1 stacking the state estimation weights of all agents and the block matrix Lt ∈ RN2×N2 with N×N
diagonal blocks ((Lt))ii = LTi,t and off diagonal blocks ((Lt))ij = −βijLTi,tLTj,t,
Lt:=

LT1,t −β12LT1,tLT2,t ... −β1NLT1,tLTN,t
−β21LT2,tLT1,t LT2,t ... −β2NLT2,tLTN,t
... ···
. . .
...
−βN−11LTN−1,tLT1,t ··· LTN−1,t −βN−1NLTN−1,tLTN,t
−βN1LTN,tLT1,t ··· −βNN−1LTN,tLTN−1,t LTN,t
. (14)
If there exists a linear equilibrium strategy as in (13), the action coefficients vt := [vT1,t, . . . ,v
T
N,t]
T ∈ RN2
can be obtained by solving the system of linear equations
Ltvt = δkt. (15)
Proof: We hypothesize that agents play according to a linear equilibrium strategy as in (13).
Substituting this candidate strategy into the equilibrium equations in (8) yields
vTi,tEi,t[x] =
∑
j∈V \{i}
βijEi,t
[
vTj,tEj,t[x]
]
+ δEi,t[θ]. (16)
The summation in (16) includes the expectations Ei,t
[
Ej,t[x]
]
of agent i on the private signals’ estimate
of agent j. As per the induction hypothesis in (12), we have that the inner expectations can be written
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as Ej,t[x] = Lj,tx. Using this fact, agent i’s expectation of agent j’s estimate of private signals becomes
Ei,t
[
Ej,t[x]
]
= Lj,tEi,t[x]. (17)
Substituting (17) and the estimate induction hypotheses in (12) for the corresponding terms in (16) and
(17), and reordering terms yield the set of equations
vTi,tLi,tx =
∑
j∈V \{i}
βijv
T
j,tLj,tLi,tx+ δ k
T
i,tx, (18)
At this point we recall that the equilibrium equations in (8) are true for all possible histories hi,t. Therefore,
the equilibrium equations in (18), which are derived from (8), have to hold irrespectively of the history’s
realization. This in turn means that they will be true for all possible values of x. This can be ensured by
equating the coefficients that multiply each component of x in (18) thereby yielding the relationships
LTi,tvi,t =
∑
j∈V \{i}
βijL
T
i,tL
T
j,tvj,t + δ ki,t, (19)
that need to hold true for all agents i. The result in (15) is just a restatement of (19) with the latter
corresponding to the i-th block of the relationship in (15).
Lemma 1 provides a mechanism to determine the strategy profiles σ∗i,t(·) of all agents through the
computation of the action vectors vi,t as a block of the vector vt that solves (15). We emphasize that
the value of the weight vector vt in (15) does not depend on the realization of private signals x. This
is as it should because the postulated equilibrium strategy in (13) assumes the action weights vi,t are
independent of the observed history. A consequence of this fact is that the action coefficients {vi,t}i∈V
of all agents can be determined locally by all agents as long as the matrices Li,t and vectors vi,t are
common knowledge. The equilibrium actions a∗i (t), however, do depend on the observed history because
to determine the action a∗i (t) = σ
∗
i,t(hi,t) = v
T
i,tEi,t[x] we multiply v
T
i,t by the expectation Ei,t[x]
associated with the actual observed history hi,t. See Section IV for details.
At time t agent i computes its action vector vi,t which it uses to select the equilibrium action a∗i (t) =
vTi,tEi,t[x] as per (13). Since we have also hypothesized that Ei,t [x] = Li,tx, as per (12) the action of
agent i at time t is given by
ai(t) = v
T
i,tLi,tx. (20)
We emphasize that as in (12) the expression in (20) is not the computation made by agent i but an
equivalent computation from the perspective of an external omniscient observer.
February 4, 2013 DRAFT
11
The actions an(i)(t) := [aji,1(t), . . . , aji,d(i)(t)]T ∈ Rd(i)×1 of neighboring agents j ∈ n(i) become part
of the observed history hi,t+1 of agent i at time t + 1 [cf. (3)]. The important consequence of (20) is
that these observations are a linear combination of private signals x. In particular, by defining the matrix
HTi,t := [v
T
ji,1,t
Lji,1,t; . . . ;v
T
ji,d(i),t
Lji,d(i),t] ∈ Rd(i)×N we can write
an(i)(t) = H
T
i,tx :=

vTji,1,tLji,1,t
...
vTji,d(i),tLji,d(i),t
x. (21)
Agent i’s belief of x at time t is normally distributed; moreover, when we go from time t to time t+ 1,
agent i observes a linear combination, an(i)(t) = HTi,tx, of private signals. Thus, the propagation of the
probability distribution when the history hi,t+1 incorporates the actions an(i)(t) is a simple sequential
LMMSE estimation problem [27, Ch. 12]. In particular, the joint posterior distribution of x and θ given
hi,t+1 remains Gaussian and the expectations Ei,t+1 [x] and Ei,t+1 [θ] remain linear combinations of
private signals x as in (12) for some matrix Li,t+1 and vector ki,t+1 which we compute explicitly in the
following lemma.
Lemma 2 Consider a Bayesian game with quadratic utility as in (2) and the same assumptions and
definitions of Lemma 1. Further define the observation matrix HTi,t := [v
T
ji,1,t
Lji,1,t; . . . ;v
T
ji,d(i),t
Lji,d(i),t] ∈
Rd(i)×N as in (21) and the LMMSE gains
Kix(t) := M
i
xx(t)Hi,t
(
HTi,tM
i
xx(t)Hi,t
)−1
, (22)
Kiθ(t) := M
i
θx(t)Hi,t
(
HTi,tM
i
xx(t)Hi,t
)−1
, (23)
and assume that agents play the linear equilibrium strategy in (13). Then, the beliefs Pi,t+1([θ,xT ]) after
observing neighboring actions at time t are Gaussian with means that can be expressed as the linear
combination of private signals
Ei,t+1 [x] = Li,t+1x, Ei,t+1 [θ] = k
T
i,t+1x, (24)
where the matrix Li,t+1 and vector ki,t+1 are given by
Li,t+1 = Li,t +K
i
x(t)
(
HTi,t −HTi,tLi,t
)
, (25)
kTi,t+1 = k
T
i,t +K
i
θ(t)
(
HTi,t −HTi,tLi,t
)
. (26)
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The posterior covariance matrix M ixx(t + 1) for the private signals x the variance M
i
θθ(t + 1) of the
state θ and the cross covariance M iθx(t+ 1) are further given by
M ixx(t+ 1) =M
i
xx(t)−Kix(t)HTi,tM ixx(t), (27)
M iθθ(t+ 1) =M
i
θθ(t)−Kiθ(t)THTi,tM ixθ(t), (28)
M iθx(t+ 1) =M
i
θx(t)−Kiθ(t)HTi,tM ixx(t). (29)
Proof: Since observations of i, an(i)(t), are linear combinations of private signals x which are
normally distributed, observations of i are also normally distributed from the perspective of i. Furthermore,
by assumption (12), the prior distribution Pi,t(x) is Gaussian. Hence, the posterior distribution, Pi,t+1(x),
is also Gaussian. Specifically, the mean of the posterior distribution corresponds to the LMMSE estimator
with gain matrix Kix(t) = M
i
xx(t)Hi,t
(
HTi,tM
i
xx(t)Hi,t
)−1; that is,
Ei,t+1[x] =Ei,t [x] +K
i
x(t)
(
an(i)(t)−Ei,t[an(i)(t)]
)
. (30)
Because θ and x are jointly Gaussian at time t, θ and an(i)(t) are also jointly Gaussian. Therefore,
the posterior distribution Pi,t+1(θ) is also Gaussian. Consequently, the Bayesian estimate of θ is given
by a sequential LMMSE estimator with gain matrix Kiθ(t) = M
i
θx(t)Hi,t
(
HTi,tM
i
xx(t)Hi,t
)−1,
Ei,t+1 [θ] =Ei,t [θ] +K
i
θ(t)
(
an(i)(t)−Ei,t
[
an(i)(t)
])
. (31)
Given the linear observation model in (21), agent i’s estimate of his observations at time t is given by
Ei,t(an(i)(t)) = H
T
i,tEi,t[x]. Substituting (12) for the mean estimates at time t in (30) and (31), we obtain
Ei,t+1 [x] = Li,tx+K
i
x(t)
(
HTi,tx−HTi,tLi,tx
)
, (32)
Ei,t+1 [θ] = k
T
i,tx+K
i
θ(t)
(
HTi,tx−HTi,tLi,tx
)
. (33)
Grouping the terms that multiply x on the right hand side of the two equations, we observe that
Ei,t+1 [x] = Li,t+1x and Ei,t+1 [θ] = kTi,t+1x where Li,t+1 and ki,t+1 are as defined in (25) and (26).
Similarly, the updates for error covariance matrices are as given in (27)–(29) following standard LMMSE
updates [27, Ch. 12].
In the repeated game we are considering, agents determine optimal actions given available information
and determine the information that is revealed by neighboring actions. These questions are respectively
answered by lemmas 1 and 2 under the inductive hypotheses of Gaussian beliefs and linear estimates as
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per (12). The answer provided by Lemma 2 also shows that the inductive hypotheses hold true at time
t + 1 and provides an explicit recursion to propagate the mean and variance of the beliefs posterior to
the observation of neighboring actions. This permits closing the inductive loop to establish the following
theorem for recursive computation of BNE of repeated games with quadratic payoffs.
Theorem 1 Consider a repeated Bayesian game with the quadratic utility function in (2) and assume
that linear strategies σ∗i,t(hi,t) = v
T
i,tEi,t[x] as in (13) exist for all times t. Then, the action coefficients
vi,t can be computed by solving the system of linear equations in (15) with vt := [vT1,t, . . . ,v
T
N,t]
T ,
kt := [k
T
1,t, . . . ,k
T
N,t]
T and Lt as in (14). The matrices Li,t and the vectors ki,t are computed by
recursive application of (22)-(23) and (25)-(29) with initial values
Li,0 = 1e
T
i , ki,0 = ei. (34)
The initial covariance matrix M ixx(0), initial variance M
i
θθ(0), and initial cross covariance M
i
θx(0) are
given by
M ixx(0) = diag(e¯i)diag(c) + e¯ie¯
T
i ci, M
i
θθ(0) = ci, M
i
θx(0) = cie¯
T
i . (35)
Proof: See Appendix A.
According to Theorem 1, the beliefs on θ and x remain Gaussian for all agents and all times when
agents play according to a linear equilibrium strategy as in (13) at each stage. Theorem 1 also provides a
recursive mechanism to compute the coefficients vi,t of the linear BNE strategies σ∗i,t(hi,t) = v
T
i,tEi,t[x]
and the coefficients Li,t and ki,t that determine the LMMSE estimates as per (12). However, these latter
expressions cannot be used by agent i to calculate estimates Ei,t [x] and Ei,t [θ] unless the private signals
x are exactly known, which will absolve agent i from responsibility of the estimation process entirely.
Since the BNE action a∗i (t) = σ
∗
i,t(hi,t) = v
T
i,tEi,t[x] depends on having the observed private signal
estimate Ei,t[x] available, Theorem 1 does not provide a way of computing the optimal action either.
This mismatch can be solved by writing the LMMSE updates in a different form as we show in the next
section after the following remark.
Remark 3 Results in this paper assume the system of linear equations in (15) has a unique solution. If
the solution is not unique, a prior agreement is necessary for agents to play consistent strategies. E.g.,
agents could agree beforehand to select the vector vt with minimum Euclidean norm. If (15) does not
have a solution, it means that the equilibrium strategies of the form in (20) do not exist. A sufficient
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an(i)(t)
∑
Kix
∑ Ei,t[x]
vTi,t ai(t)
−HTi,t−Ei,t[an(i)(t)]
M ixx(t) {kj,t}j∈V
{Lj,t}j∈V
HTi,t
x
{vj,t}j∈n(i)
{Lj,t}j∈n(i)
Kiθ
∑ Ei,t[θ]
Fig. 1. Quadratic Network Game (QNG) filter at agent i. There are two types of blocks, circle and rectangle. Arrows coming
into the circle block are summed. The arrow that goes into a rectangle block is multiplied by the coefficient written inside the
block. Inside the dashed box agent i’s mean estimate updates on x and θ are illustrated (cf. (36) and (37)). The gain coefficients
for the mean updates are fed from LMMSE block in Fig. 2. The observation matrix Hi,t is fed from the game block in Fig.
2. Agent i multiplies his mean estimate on x at time t with action coefficient vi,t, which is fed from game block in Fig. 2, to
obtain ai(t). The mean estimates Ei,t[x] and ai(t) can only be calculated by agent i.
condition for this not to happen is to have a strictly diagonally dominant utility function which in explicit
terms we write
∑
j∈V \{i} |βij | < 1. In this case Gershgorin’s Theorem implies that Lt is full rank because
it has no null eigenvalues. Laxer conditions to guarantee existence of linear equilibria as in (20) can be
found in, e.g., [28], [29]. In all of our numerical experiments solutions to (15) exist and are unique.
IV. QUADRATIC NETWORK GAME FILTER
To compute and play BNE strategies each node runs the quadratic network game (QNG) filter that
we derive in this section. Since agent i cannot use (12), we need an alternative means of computing
estimates Ei,t [x] and Ei,t [θ]. To do this refer to the transformation of (30) and (31) into (32) and (33)
in the proof of Lemma 2. In this transformation we substitute the observed neighboring actions an(i)(t)
for their model an(i)(t) = HTi,tx and write the expectation of these actions as H
T
i,tEi,t[x] with the further
substitution Ei,t [x] = Li,tx. As a result we can rewrite (30) and (31) as
Ei,t+1[x] = Ei,t [x] +K
i
x(t)
(
an(i)(t)−HTi,tEi,t[x]
)
, (36)
Ei,t+1[θ] = Ei,t [θ] +K
i
θ(t)
(
an(i)(t)−HTi,tEi,t[x]
)
. (37)
The updates in (36) and (37) can be implemented locally by agent i since they depend on the previous
values Ei,t[x] and Ei,t[θ] of the LMMSE estimates, and the observed neighboring actions an(i)(t). They
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can be combined with the coefficient recursions in (15), (22)-(23), and (25)-(29) as well as with the
BNE strategy expression in (13) to recursively compute the equilibrium actions a∗i (t) given the observed
history hi,t.
The updates in (13), (15), (22)-(23), (25)-(29), and (36)-(37) form the QNG filter. In the QNG filter
agent i performs a full network simulation in which it maintains a belief Pi,t([θ,xT ]) on the state of
the world θ and the private signals x of all agents. This implies performing the coefficient updates (15),
(22)-(23), (25)-(29) for all agents in the network. This he can do because the network topology and
private signal models are common knowledge. The updates (13) and (36)-(37) are performed for agent
i’s own index only.
The signal updates on (36)-(37) are illustrated inside the dashed box in Fig. 1. At time t, the inputs to the
filter are the observed actions an(i)(t) of agent i’s neighbors. The prediction Ei,t[an(i)(t)] = Hi,tEi,t[x]
of this vector is subtracted from the observed value and the resultant error is fed into two parallel blocks
respectively tasked with updating the belief Ei,t[θ] on the state of the world θ, and the belief Ei,t[x] on
the private signals x of other agents. The error an(i),t −Ei,t[an(i),t] is multiplied by the gain Kix(t) and
the resultant innovation is added to the previous mean estimate to correct the estimate of x [cf. (36)].
Similarly, the error is multiplied by the gain Kiθ(t) and the resultant innovation is added to the previous
mean estimate to correct the estimate of θ at i [cf. (37)]. In order to determine the equilibrium play as
per (13), agent i multiples his private signal estimate Ei,t[x] by the vector vi(t) obtained by solving the
system of linear equations in (15).
Observe that in the QNG filter, we do not use the fact that estimates Ei,t [θ] and Ei,t[x] as well as
actions ai,t can be written as linear combinations of the private signals [cf. (12) and (20)]. While the
expressions in (12) and (20) are certainly correct, they cannot be used for implementation because x is
only partially unknown to agent i. The role of (12) and (20) is to allow derivation of recursions that we
use to keep track of the gains used in the QNG filter. These recursions can be divided into a group of
LMMSE updates and a group of game updates as we show in Fig. 2.
As it follows from (22)-(23) and (27)-(29), the update of LMMSE coefficients is identical to the gain
and covariance updates of a sequential LMMSE. The only peculiarity is that the observation matrix Hj,t
is fed from the game update block and is partially determined by the LMMSE gains and covariances of
previous iterations. Nevertheless, this peculiarity is more associated with the game block than with the
LMMSE block. The game block uses (25) and (26) to keep track of the matrices Lj,t and the vectors
kj,t. The matrices Lj,t are used as building blocks of the matrix Lt and the vectors kj,t are stacked in
the vector kt and used to formulate the systems of equations in (15). Solving this system of equations,
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using L−1t when it is full rank or its pseudo inverse when it is not, yields the coefficients vj,t which
in turn determine the observation matrix Hj,t as per (21). As mentioned before, the game block feeds
the matrices Hj,t to the filter block as they are used in the LMMSE gains and covariance updates. The
LMMSE block feeds the gains Kjx(t) and K
j
θ(t) to the game block as these are needed to update Lj,t
and kj,t.
We remark that agent i is keeping track of the matrices and vectors in Fig. 2 for all i ∈ V . I.e., agent
i calculates observation matrices Hj,t for j ∈ V in the game block which are fed into the LMMSE block
to obtain gains matrices Kjx(t) and K
j
θ(t) for all j ∈ V . These gains are fed into the game block from the
LMMSE block as they are needed to update Lj,t and kj,t for all j ∈ V . The reason for this is the step in
the game block in which we compute the play coefficients vj,t. To solve this system of equations, agent
i needs to build the matrix Lt that is formed by the blocks Lj,t of all agents. All of these computations
for the coefficients of other agents are internal to agent i and independent of the game realization. The
gains can be computed offline prior to running the game.
Remark 4 The QNG filter can also be used in repeated games with purely informational externalities. In
this case each agent’s payoff is given by u(θ, ai) = −(θ−ai)2, and the problem is thus equivalent to the
distributed estimation of the world state θ [4]. Our model subsumes the games with purely informational
externalities as a special case. Given this payoff function, the best response of agent i at time t is the
action ai(t) = Ei,t[θ]. Hence, it is not necessary to solve (15) for the optimal strategy coefficients vi,t.
Other than this the QNG filter remains unchanged. Since in the case of purely informational externalities
the end goal is the estimation of θ, the QNG filter is tantamount to an optimal distributed implementation
of a Kalman filter.
V. VECTOR STATES AND VECTOR OBSERVATIONS
Consider the case when state of the world is a vector, that is, θ ∈ Rm for m > 1. Similar to the scalar
case, each agent receives initial private signal xi ∈ Rm,
xi = θ + i (38)
where the additive noise term i ∈ Rm is multivariate Gaussian with zero mean and variance-covariance
matrix Ci ∈ Rm×m. For future reference, define the vector obtained by stacking elements at the kth
row and lth column of variance-covariance matrices of all agents, Ck,l := [C1[k, l], . . . , CN [k, l]]T . We
use xi[n] to denote the nth private signal of agent i where n ≤ m. We assume that private signals are
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Variable
Lj,t
kj,t
vj,t
Hj,t
Game coefficients
Update
Lj,t+1 = Lj,t +K
j
x(t)
(
HTj,t −HTj,tLj,t
)
(25)
kTj,t+1 = k
T
j,t +K
j
θ(t)
(
HTj,t −HTj,tLj,t
)
(26)
Ltvt = δkt (15)
Hj,t :=
[
vTkj,1,t
Lkj,1,t; . . . ;v
T
kj,d(j),t
Lkj,d(j),t]
T
(21)
Variable
Kjx(t)
Kjθ(t)
Mjxx(t)
Mjθx(t)
LMMSE coefficients
Update
Kjx(t) = M
j
xx(t)Hj,t
(
HTj,tM
j
xx(t)Hj,t
)−1
(22)
Kjθ(t) = M
j
θx(t)Hj,t
(
HTj,tM
j
xx(t)Hj,t
)−1
(23)
Mjxx(t+ 1) = M
j
xx(t)−Kjx(t)HTj,tMjxx(t) (27)
Mjθx(t+ 1) = M
j
θx(t)−Kjθ(t)HTj,tMjxx(t) (29)
Hj,t
Kjx(t)
Kjθ(t)
vi,t Hi,t
to QNG filterto QNG filter
Kix(t) K
i
θ(t)
to QNG filterto QNG filter
Fig. 2. Propagation of gains required to implement the Quadratic Network Game (QNG) filter of Fig. 1. Gains are separated
into interacting LMMSE and game blocks. All agents perform a full network simulation in which they compute the gains of
all other agents. This is necessary because when we compute the play coefficients vj,t in the game block, agent i builds the
matrix Lt that is formed by the blocks Lj,t of all agents [cf. (14)]. This full network simulation is possible because the network
topology and private signal models are common knowledge.
independent among agents, that is, Ei,0[ij ] = 0 for all i ∈ V and j ∈ V \ {i}. We define the set of all
private signals as
x := [x1[1], . . . ,xN [1], . . . ,x1[m], . . . ,xN [m]]
T , (39)
where x ∈ RNm×1. We use x[n] := [x1[n], . . . ,xN [n]]T to denote the vector of private signals of agents
on the nth state of the world.
At each stage t, agent i takes action ai(t) ∈ Rm. Agent i’s action at time t is to maximize a payoff
function which is represented by the following quadratic function
ui(ai, {aj}j∈V \i,θ) = −
1
2
∑
j∈V
aTj aj +
∑
j∈V \{i}
aTi Bijaj + a
T
i Dθ, (40)
where constants Bij and D belong to Rm×m. Similar to the scalar case, other additive terms that depend
on {aj}j∈V \i and θ can exist without changing the results to follow. We obtain the best response function
for agent i by taking the derivative of the expected utility function with respect to ai, equating it to zero,
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and solving for ai:
BRi,t({σj,t(hj,t)}j∈V \i) =
∑
j∈V \i
BijEi,t[σj,t(hj,t)] +DEi,t[θ]. (41)
Note that BRt : RNm → RNm.
Similar to the case when the unknown parameter is a scalar, it is sufficient for agents to keep track
of estimates of x in order to achieve the best estimate of θ. Accordingly, the definitions of estimates of
private signals and the unknown parameters and their corresponding covariance matrices (9)–(11) are the
same as in the scalar case.
In what follows, we show that the mean estimates are linear in private signals and equilibrium actions
are linear in expectations of private signals in the similar fashion we did for the scalar state of the world.
Lemma 3 Consider a Bayesian game with quadratic utility as in (40). Suppose that for all agents i, the
joint posterior beliefs on the state of the world θ and the private signals x given the local history hi,t
at time t, Pi,t([θT ,xT ]), are Gaussian with means expressed as
Ei,t [θ] = Qi,tx, and Ei,t[x] = Li,tx, (42)
where Li,t ∈ RNm×Nm and Qi,t ∈ Rm×Nm are known estimation weights. If there exists an equilibrium
strategy profile that is linear in expectations of private signals,
σ∗i,t(hi,t) = Ui,tEi,t[x] for all i ∈ V, (43)
then the action coefficients {Ui,t}i∈V can be obtained by solving the system of linear equations
LTi,tU
T
i,t =
∑
j∈V \i
LTi,tL
T
j,tU
T
j,tB
T
ij +Q
T
i,tD
T , for all i ∈ V (44)
Proof: The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 1. By substituting the candidate strategies in
(43) to the best response function in (41) for all i ∈ V , we obtain the following equilibrium equations
Ui,tEi,t[x] =
∑
j∈V \{i}
BijEi,t[Uj,tEj,t[x]] +DEi,t[θ]. (45)
for all i ∈ V . After using the fact that Ei,t[Ej,t[x]] = Lj,tEi,t[x] with mean estimate assumptions in (42)
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for the corresponding terms in (45), we obtain the following set of equations
Ui,tLi,tx =
∑
j∈V \{i}
BijUj,tLj,tLi,tx+DQi,tx. (46)
We ensure that the strategies in (43) satisfy the equilibrium equations for any realization of history by
equating coefficients that multiply each component of x in (46) which yields the set of equations given
by (44).
For a linear equilibrium strategy, the actions can be written as a linear combination of the private
signals using (42), that is, the action of agent i at time t is given by
ai(t) = Ui,tLi,tx for all i ∈ V. (47)
Being able to express actions as in (47) permits writing observations of agents in linear form. From the
perspective of an observer, the action aj(t) is equivalent to observing a linear combination of private
signals. As a result, we can represent observation vector of agent i an(i)(t) :=
[
aj1(t), . . . ,ajd(i)(t)
]T ∈
Rmd(i) in linear form as
an(i)(t) = H
T
i,tx = [Uj1,tLj1,t; . . . ;Ujd(i),tLjd(i),t]x (48)
where HTi,t = [Uj1,tLj1,t; . . . ;Ujd(i),tLjd(i),t] ∈ Rmd(i)×Nm is the observation matrix of agent i.
Agent i’s belief of x at time t is normal, and at time t + 1 agent i observes a linear combination of
x. Hence, agent i’s belief at time t + 1 can be obtained by a sequential LMMSE update. As a result,
mean estimates remain weighted sums of private signals as in (42). In the following lemma, we explicitly
present the way we compute the estimation weights, Li,t+1 and Qi,t+1, at time t+ 1 when θ ∈ Rm.
Lemma 4 Consider a Bayesian game with quadratic function as in (40) and the same assumptions and
definitions of Lemma 3. Further define the gain matrices as
Kix(t) := M
i
xx(t)Hi,t
(
HTi,tM
i
xx(t)Hi,t
)−1
, (49)
Kiθ(t) := M
i
θx(t)Hi,t
(
HTi,tM
i
xx(t)Hi,t
)−1
. (50)
If agents play according to a linear equilibrium strategy then agent i’s posterior Pi,t+1([θT ,xT ]) is
Gaussian with means that are linear combination of private signals,
Ei,t+1 [θ] = Qi,t+1x, and Ei,t+1[x] = Li,t+1x, (51)
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where the estimation matrices are given by
Li,t+1 = Li,t +K
i
x(t)
(
HTi,t −HTi,tLi,t
)
, (52)
Qi,t+1 = Qi,t +K
i
θ(t)
(
HTi,t −HTi,t, Li,t
)
, (53)
and the covariance matrices are further given by
M ixx(t+ 1) =M
i
xx(t)−Kix(t)HTi,tM ixx(t), (54)
M iθθ(t+ 1) =M
i
θθ(t)−
[
Kiθ(t)
THTi,tM
i
xθ(t)
]T
, (55)
M iθx(t+ 1) =M
i
θx(t)−Kiθ(t)HTi,tM ixx(t). (56)
Proof: The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 2 with the action coefficients Ui,t taking the
place of vi,t.
Lemma 4 shows that when mean estimates are linear combinations of private signals at time t, they
remain that way at time t + 1. In the next theorem, we show that assumption in (42) is indeed true
for all time by realizing that the estimates at time t = 0 are linear combinations of private signals.
To simplify presentation of initial conditions, we assume that agent i’s private signals are independent,
Ei,0[xi[k]xi[l]] = 0 for all k = 1, . . . ,m and l 6= k.
Theorem 2 Given the quadratic utility function in (40), if there exists a linear equilibrium strategy σ∗t
as in (43) for t ∈ N, then the action coefficients Ui,t can be computed by solving the system of linear
equations in (44), and further, agents’ estimates of x and θ are linear combinations of private signals as
in (42) with estimation matrices computed recursively using (49)-(50) and (52)-(56) with initial values
Qi,0 :=
 e
T
i 01×N ... 01×N
01×N eTi ... 01×N
... ···
. . .
...
01×N ... 01×N eTi
 ∈ Rm×Nm, (57)
Li,0 := diag
([
1eTi , . . . ,1e
T
i
]) ∈ RNm×Nm, (58)
where ei ∈ RN . The initial covariance matrix M ixx(0) ∈ RNm×Nm is a diagonal block matrix with
N × N blocks ((M ixx))k,k ∈ RN×N for k = 1, . . . ,m , initial variance M iθθ(0) ∈ Rm×m and initial
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Algorithm 1 QNG filter for θ ∈ Rd
Initialization: Set posterior distribution on θ and x[
θ
x
] ∣∣hi,0 ∼ N ([Qi,0xLi,0x
]
,
(
M iθθ(0),M
i
θx(0)
M ixθ(0),M
i
xx(0)
))
and {Lj,0,kj,0}j∈V according to (57) and (58).
For t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
1) Equilibrium strategy: Solve for {Uj,t}j∈V using the set of equations in (44).
2) Play and observe: Take action ai(t) = Ui,tEi,t[x] and observe an(i)(t).
3) Observation matrix: Construct Hi,t using (48).
4) Bayesian estimates: Update Ei,t[x] and Ei,t[θ] using (30) and (31), respectively. Update error
covariance matrices using (54)–(56).
5) Estimation weights: Update {Lj,t,kj,t}j∈V using (52)–(53).
cross covariance M iθx(0) ∈ Rm×Nm are given by(
(M ixx)
)
k,k
= diag(e¯i)diag(Ck,k) + e¯ie¯
T
i Ci[k, k], (59)
M iθθ(0) = Ci, (60)
M iθx(0) = Ci
 e¯
T
i 01×N ... 01×N
01×N e¯Ti ... 01×N
... ···
. . .
...
01×N ... 01×N e¯Ti
 (61)
Proof: See Appendix B.
Similar to the scalar case, when network structure and the equilibrium strategy profile are common
knowledge, agent i can calculate the weights {Uj,t}j∈V for all t and update his estimates locally. In
Algorithm 1, we provide a sequential local algorithm for agent i to calculate updates for θ and x and to
act according to equilibrium strategy. The Bayesian rational learning defined here in Algorithm 1 for the
vector state case follows the same steps for the scalar case defined in Section IV and by Figs. 1 and 2.
VI. COURNOT COMPETITION
In a Cournot competition model N firms produce a common good that they sell in a market with
limitless demand. The cost per production unit c is common for all firms and constant for all times. The
selling unit price, however, decreases as the total amount of goods produced by all companies increases.
We adopt the specific linear model p−∑j∈V aj for the selling unit price, where p is the constant market
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price when no goods are produced. The profit of firm i for production level ai ∈ R+ is therefore given
by the utility
ui(ai, {aj}j∈V \i, θ) = −cai + (p− ai −
∑
j∈V \i
aj)ai. (62)
The utility function in (62) is not of the quadratic form given in (2) because there are two information
externalities, the cost c and the clearing price p. While it is possible to resort to the vector form of the
QNG filter covered in Section V, it is simpler to write (62) in a form compatible with (2) by defining
the parameter θ := p− c as the effective unit profit at the market price. Using this definition in (62) and
reordering terms yields
ui(ai, {aj}j∈V \i, θ) = (θ − ai −
∑
j∈V \i
aj)ai. (63)
Since this utility function is of the form in (2), we can use the QNG filter of Section IV as summarized
in Figs. 1 and 2 to determine subsequent BNE production levels. The explicit form of the equilibrium
equation in (8) is
σ∗i,t(hi,t) =
1
2
Ei,t[θ]− 1
2
∑
j∈V \i
Ei,t[σ
∗
j,t(hj,t)]. (64)
It is immediate from (64) that when Ei,t[θ] < 0 it is best for firm i to shut down production. To avoid
boundary conditions we restrict attention to cases where private signals x are such that Ei,t[θ] > 0 for
all i ∈ V and t ∈ N. This can be guaranteed if all private signals are nonnegative, i.e., x ≥ 0. In a game
with complete information all private signals x are known to all agents. In this case the (regular) Nash
equilibrium actions of all agents coincide and are given by
a∗i =
E[θ
∣∣x]
N + 1
for all i ∈ V. (65)
The numerical simulations in the next section show that the BNE strategies in (64) converge to the
(regular) Nash equilibrium strategy (65) in a finite number of steps.
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Fig. 4. Agents’ actions over time for the Cournot competition game and networks shown in Fig. 3. Each line indicates the
quantity produced for an individual at each stage. Actions converge to the Nash equilibrium action of the complete information
game in the number of steps equal to the diameter of the network.
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Fig. 5. Normed error in estimates of privates signals, ‖x−Ei,t[x]‖22, for the Cournot competition game and networks shown
in Fig. 3. Each line corresponds to an agent’s normed error in mean estimates of private signals over the time horizon. While
all of the agents learn the true values of all the private signals in line and ring networks, in the star network only the central
agent learns all of the private signals.
A. Learning in Cournot competition
The underlying effective unit profit is chosen as θ = 12$/unit. Firms observe private signals with the
additive noise term coming from standard normal distribution, i.e., i ∼ N (0, 1). Given this setting, we
consider three benchmark networks: a line network with N = 5 firms, a star network with N = 5 firms,
and a ring network with N = 10 firms (see Fig. 3).
The quantities produced by firms over time are shown in Fig. 4 for the line (a), star (b) and ring (c)
networks. In all of the cases, we observe consensus in the units produced. Furthermore, the consensus
production a∗ is optimal; that is, firms converge to the Bayes-Nash equilibrium under complete informa-
tion (65). This implies that all of the firms learn the best estimate of θ by the convergence time T , that
is, Ei,T [θ
∣∣hi,T ] = E[θ ∣∣x] for all i ∈ V .
Figs. 5(a)–(c) show the error in estimation of private signals ‖x− Ei,t[x]‖22 for all i ∈ V and t ∈ N.
In Figs. 5(a) and 5(c), corresponding to line and ring networks, the mean square error in private signal
estimates goes to zero for all of the firms at the end of the convergence time T . On the other hand, in the
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Fig. 6. Mobile agents in a 3-dimensional coordination game. Agents observe initial noisy private signals on heading and
take-off angles. Agents revise their estimates on true heading and take-off angles and coordinate their movement angles with
each other through local observations.
star network in Fig. 5(b), except for the center firm 5, none of the other firms has zero mean square error
in private signal estimates. This means that these firms do not learn at least one of the private signals.
As we know from Fig. 4 (b), all of the firms in the star network learn the best estimate of θ given all
of the private signals. Hence, in the star network, firms only learn the sufficient statistic to estimate θ
(which is the average of the private signals) rather than learning each of the private signals individually.
Figs. 4(a)–(c) suggest that convergence is achieved in O(∆) steps where ∆ is the diameter of the
graph. In [4], it is argued that for the distributed estimation problems when the individual utility function
is equal to ui(ai, θ) = −(ai − θ)2, convergence happens in O(∆) steps for tree networks. Our results
show that the convergence rate is O(∆) not only for tree networks such as line and star networks but
also for the ring network when the utility function is quadratic and includes actions of others.
VII. COORDINATION GAME
A network of autonomous agents want to align themselves so that they move toward a goal (x∗, y∗, z∗)
on 3-dimensional space following a straight path, and at the same time maintain their initial starting
formation. When the goal (x∗, y∗, z∗) is far away, then there exists a common correct direction of
movement toward the goal characterized by the heading angle on the x − y plane φ ∈ [0◦, 180◦] and
the take-off angle on the x − z plane ψ ∈ [0◦, 180◦]. Hence, the target movement direction is given by
θ = [φ, ψ]T . Fig. 6 illustrates a set of autonomous agents on a 3-dimensional plane and their heading
and take-off angles where the x, y, z axes are depicted for agent 1.
Mobile agents have the goal of maintaining the starting formation while moving at equal speed by
coordinating their movement direction with other agents. Agents need to coordinate with the entire
population while communication is restricted to neighboring agents whose direction of movement they
can observe. In this context, agent i’s decision ai ∈ [0, 180◦] × [0, 180◦] represents the heading and
take-off angles in the direction of movement. The estimation and coordination goals of agent i can be
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represented with the following payoff
ui(ai, {aj}j∈V \i,θ) = −
1− λ
2
(ai − θ)T (ai − θ)− λ
2(N − 1)
∑
j∈V \{i}
(ai − aj)T (ai − aj). (66)
The first term is the estimation error in the true heading and take-off angles. The second term is the
coordination component that measures the discrepancy between the direction of movement and those of
other agents. λ is a constant in (0, 1) gauging the importance of estimation term with respect to the
coordination term.
The same payoff formulation can be motivated by looking at learning in organizations [30]. In an
organization, individuals share a set of common tasks and have the incentive to coordinate with other
units. Each individual receives a private piece of information about the task that needs to be performed
while only being able to share his information with whom he has a direct contact in the organization.
Note that the utility function is of the quadratic form given in (40) with vector states and vector actions.
Hence, we can use the QNG filter in Section V as summarized in Algorithm 1. As postulated in (8), the
explicit equilibrium equation for all i ∈ V is
σ∗i,t(hi,t) = (1− λ)Ei,t[θ] +
λ
N − 1
∑
j∈V \{i}
Ei,t[σ
∗
j,t(hj,t))]. (67)
In a game with complete information, the Bayes-Nash equilibrium actions of all agents coincide and
are given by
a∗i = E[θ
∣∣x]. (68)
In the next section, we show that the equilibrium actions in (67) converge to the Bayes-Nash equilibrium
with complete information as given by (68) in finite number of steps.
A. Learning in coordination games
The correct direction vector is chosen to be θ = [10◦, 20◦]T . We let λ = 0.5. The noise terms, i are
jointly Gaussian with mean zero and covariance matrix equal to the identity matrix. Having an identity
covariance matrix implies that E[xi[1]xi[2]] = 0.
We evaluate equilibrium behavior in geometric and random networks with N = 50 agents, Figs. 7 (a)
and (b), respectively. Geometric random network is created by placing the agents randomly on a 4 meter
× 4 meter square and connecting pairs with distance less than 1 meter between them. In the random
network, any pair of agents are neighbors with probability 0.1. The geometric network in Fig. 7 (a) has
a diameter of ∆g = 5 where the random network in Fig. 7 (b) has a diameter of ∆r = 4.
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Fig. 7. Geometric (a) and random (b) networks with N = 50 agents. Agents are randomly placed on a 4 meter × 4 meter
square. There exists an edge between any pair of agents with distance less than 1 meter apart in the geometric network. In the
random network, the connection probability between any pair of agents is independent and equal to 0.1.
The direction of movement of each agent over time is depicted in Figs. 8(a)–(d). Figs. 8(a) and 8(b)
show the heading angle φi of agents in geometric and random networks, respectively. Figs. 8(c) and 8(d)
show the take-off angle ψi of agents in geometric and random networks, respectively. Fig. 8 illustrates
that agents’ movement directions converge to the best estimates in heading and take-off angles in a finite
number of steps. As a result, at the end of the convergence time T , we have Ei,t[φ
∣∣hi,T ] = E[φ ∣∣x[1]]
and Ei,t[ψ
∣∣hi,T ] = E[ψ ∣∣x[2]] for all i ∈ V . Further, convergence time is in the order of the diameter
for both of the networks. This means that agents learn the sufficient statistic to calculate best estimates
in the amount of time it takes for information to propagate through the network.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced the QNG filter that agents can run locally to update their beliefs and select
equilibrium actions actions in repeated quadratic games with both information and payoff externalities.
The QNG filter provides a mechanism to update beliefs in a Bayes’ way when agents’ initial prior over
the state of the world is Gaussian. We began by showing that when the prior estimates of private signals
are Gaussian with means equal to a linear combination of private signals, and the equilibrium strategies
of agents are linear combination of mean estimates of private signals, Bayesian updates of estimates
of private signals and the underlying state follow a sequential LMMSE estimator. This meant that the
estimates remain linear combinations of private signals, and hence, Gaussian. By induction, estimates
remain Gaussian for all times if equilibrium actions that are linear in mean of the estimates exist at
all the stages. Further, we derived an explicit recursion for tracking of estimates of private signals and
calculating equilibrium actions which we leverage to develop the QNG filter. We then extended the QNG
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Fig. 8. Agents’ actions over time for the coordination game and networks shown in Fig. 7. Values of agents’ actions over time
for heading angle φi (top) and take-off angle ψi in geometric (left) and random (right) networks respectively. Action consensus
happens in the order of the diameter of the corresponding networks.
filter to the case when the state of the world is a vector. We exemplified the QNG filter in Cournot
competition game and coordination of mobile agents on 3-dimensional space. In the former the state of
the world, effective profit, was a scalar, whereas in the latter the state of the world was a vector including
heading and take-off angles. In both examples, the QNG filter converged to the BNE of the game in
number of steps that is equal to the order of the diameter of the network. This meant that agents learnt
the sufficient statistic of the state while not necessarily learning all the individual private signals.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:
At time t = 0 beliefs are normal and have the form in (12). Indeed, since the only information available
to agent i at time t = 0 is the private signal xi it follows from the linear observation model in (1) that
this is the value assigned to the estimate of all private signals as well as to the estimate of the state θ,
Ei,0 [xj ] = xi for all j, Ei,0 [θ] = xi. (69)
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The elements of the matrix Li,0 = 1eTi are 1 in the ith column and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the first
expression in (69) is equivalent to the first expression in (34). Likewise, since the ith element of ei is
one with remaining elements zero, the second expression in (69) is equivalent to the second expression in
(34). As for the variances in (35), note that the initial estimate of x has error covariance matrix defined as
in (9) for t = 0. By substituting initial mean estimates inside (9) and then using the fact that eTi x = xi,
the error covariance matrix can be rewritten as
M ixx(0) =Ei,0
[(
x− 1xi
)(
x− 1xi
)T ] (70)
From (70), we get the following by using the fact that xj − xi = j − i by (1),
M ixx(0) =Ei,0
[(
− 1i
)(
− 1i
)T ]
. (71)
When we expand the terms in (71), we obtain the following
M ixx(0) =Ei,0
[
T
]−Ei,0 [1T i]−Ei,0 [1iT ]+ 11TEi,0 [2i ] (72)
=diag(c)− ei1T ci − 1eTi ci + 11T ci (73)
=diag(c) + e¯ie¯Ti ci − eieTi ci (74)
Since private signals are independent among agents, that is Ei,0[kj ] = 0 for all j ∈ V \ k and k ∈ V ,
we have Ei,0[T ] = diag(c), Ei,0[i] = eici. Using these relations and the definition of noise variance
ci = E[
2
i ], (73) follows from (72). When second and third terms are subtracted from the fourth term in
(73), we obtain the last two terms in (74). Now, observe that diag(c)− eieTi ci = diag(e¯i)diag(c), hence
(74) can be rewritten as in (35).
Consider the variance of θ defined in (10) at time t = 0. Substituting Ei,0[θ] = xi inside (10), we have
M iθθ(0) = Ei,0
[
(θ − xi)2
]
(75)
By the signal structure (1) with additive zero mean Gaussian term i, we have θ−xi = −i. As a result,
M iθθ(0) = Ei,0[
2
i ] which is in return equal to ci. Next consider the cross-covariance between θ and x
defined in (11) at time t = 0,
M iθx(0) =Ei,0
[(
θ −Ei,0 [θ]
)(
x−Ei,0 [x]
)T ] (76)
=Ei,0
[
(−i)(− 1i)T
]
(77)
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The second equality follows by substitution of initial mean estimates and then using the definition of
private signals (1). Next, we multiply out the terms in (77), use independence of private signals between
agents to get (35).
The inductive hypotheses is then true at time t = 0 with the explicit initializations in (34) and (35).
Lemma 2 has already shown that if the inductive hypothesis is true at time t, it is also true at time t+ 1.
It also provided the explicit recursions in (22)-(23) and (25)-(29). Lemma 1 further shows that the action
coefficients vi,t can be computed by solving the system of linear equations in (15).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2:
At time t = 0, agents beliefs are normal and have the form in (42). Since the only information available
to agent i at time t = 0 is the private signal xi, it follows from the observation model in (38) that agent i
assigns xi as his mean estimates of the underlying parameter vector and the private signals as in (57)-(58).
Next, consider the initial error covariance matrix M ixx(0),
M ixx(0) = Ei,0
[
(x−Ei,0[x]) (x−Ei,0[x])T
]
(78)
= Ei,0


x[1]− 1xi[1]
...
x[N ]− 1xi[N ]


x[1]− 1xi[1]
...
x[N ]− 1xi[N ]

T
 (79)
Substituting initial mean estimates (58) in (78) and using the fact that 1eTi x[n] = 1xi[n], we get (79).
Let [n] := [1[n], . . . , N [n]]T ∈ RN denote the noise values of agents on the nth state of the world,
then we can write each N ×N block of the matrix obtained in (79) as follows
Ei,0
[
(x[k]− 1xi[k])(x[l]− 1xi[l])T
]
= Ei,0
[
([k]− 1i[k]) ([l]− 1i[l])T
]
. (80)
Since initial private signals of agent i are assumed to be independent of each other, that is, Ei,0[i[k]i[l]] =
0 for all k = 1, . . . ,m and l 6= k, (80) is zero when k 6= l. When k = l, (80) is equivalent to (71). As
a result, for the N ×N blocks at the diagonals of M ixx(0), we obtain (59) which is similar to its scalar
counterpart given in (35). Consider the variance of θ at time t = 0. Using (57), we obtain that M iθθ(0)
is as given in (60). The initial cross covariance can also be calculated using initial mean estimates in
(57) and (58) in a similar way.
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Given the normal prior Pi,0([θT ,xT ]) with mean estimates given by (57)-(58), the inductive hypothesis
in Lemma 3 is satisfied at time t = 0. Further, by our assumption there exists a linear equilibrium action
with weights Ui,0 that can be calculated by solving the set of equations in (44). Lemma 4 already provides
a way to propagate beliefs when agents play according to linear equilibrium strategy. Furthermore, by
Lemma 4, if the inductive hypothesis is true at time t then it is also true at time t+ 1.
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